

# OPTIONS FOR NATO MULTINATIONAL MARITIME FORCES (NMMFS)

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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
NEWPORT, RI**

**OPTIONS FOR  
NATO MULTINATIONAL MARITIME FORCES (NMMFS)**

The Atlantic Strategy Division prepared this paper for the Strategy and Campaign Department of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies.

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31 May 1991

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## INTRODUCTION

(U) The political upheaval in Central and Eastern Europe marked 1989 as a critical watershed in East/West relations. The imminent drawdown of Western naval forces being proposed as a result of these fundamental political and military structural changes in Europe has prompted an investigation into the increased use of multinational forces at sea by both NATO staffs and the individual nations of the Alliance.

(U) The CNWS 1990/91 study "Arms Reduction in Europe: Some Implications for Naval Operations" examined the impact of the force reductions in Europe on the employment and posture of the navies of the major Western powers. The paper discussed the future security policy of the Alliance setting the backdrop against which the contribution of maritime forces could be measured. Future roles, tasks and missions were developed, and the effects on availability and readiness were explored.

(U) The final chapter of the Study reviewed the impact these changes could have on the role that multinationality would play in meeting the requirement for future Alliance maritime forces. Three options were generated and they are presented here together with discussion of their advantages and drawbacks. Separate publication of these options is warranted in order to more readily join the current debate on future NMMF requirements. Although the chapter has been modified to stand alone, it is recommended that the complete Study be reviewed to provide the backdrop against which this extract has been developed.

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## OPTIONS FOR NMMFS

(U) **Advantages of NMMFs:** The advantages of NMMFs are based on their visibility in emphasizing NATO's continuing unity and commitment to the importance of the sea. This unity is enhanced by ensuring the European nations' full participation and commitment to burden sharing with the flags of many of the NATO allies visibly involved in operations at sea. Multinational operations may also be viewed as less provocative and, therefore, less escalatory than those of any single nation. At the same time, NMMFs offer the opportunity to reduce the requirement to deploy nationally commanded forces to areas of common NATO interest. At an operational level, multinational forces often provide specific additional capabilities over and above those provided from a single nation. Moreover, by being available for immediate deployment to areas of common Alliance interest, correctly configured multinational forces provide a potent capability for preventing or defusing a crisis or in terminating conflict. As a result, other NATO maritime forces could be held at lower readiness and availability states. Finally, multinational forces are able to offer what may become the only opportunities for crucial combined force training and exercises.

(U) **Precedent:** Alliance navies have a considerable tradition of operating in a multinational environment. Currently, two Standing Naval Forces (SNFs) and one On-Call Naval Force (OCNF) are in existence: the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT), the Standing Naval Force Channel STANAVFORCHAN, and the Naval On-Call Force in the Mediterranean (NAVOCFORMED). Each group trains as a multinational, operational unit under NATO command. The groups exercise current NATO maritime strategy using standard operating procedures and tactics and participating regularly in the the major NATO

maritime exercise program. These NMMFs have proved themselves ideal vehicles with which to display NATO commitment, unity and capability for combined operations at sea. Moreover, SNF and the OCNF concepts also contribute to sub-strategic deterrence through the display of united NATO resolve and purpose.

**(U) Employment of NMMFs within the Treaty Area:** Currently, given the unstable conditions within the Soviet Union and a large, if benign, modern Soviet "fleet in being", there is a continuing need for NATO to be able to match the formidable Soviet naval capability. This requirement is particularly relevant while questions exist concerning Soviet intentions which could still change from being currently non-aggressive to something more menacing. NMMFs provide a firm foundation with which to ensure Alliance maritime forces remain capable of countering the Soviet Navy should the need arise.

**(U)** In the longer term and assuming an increasingly stable, economically successful and well-armed group of republics form a reconstituted Soviet Union, NATO would still need to show positive support of the fundamental issue at the bedrock of Alliance strategy that the sea continues to provide the crucial linchpin in ensuring the economic existence of the member nations. If a future crisis were to occur in Europe, the need for maritime forces to support the defense on the ground, the need for timely reinforcement and the ability to defend against seaborne attack will continue to remain essential. A summary of the in-area tasks and missions of multinational forces during peace through to war is illustrated at Figure 1. This summary highlights that significant contributions could be made in peace in the crucial tasking areas of Crisis Prevention and Conflict Avoidance, particularly through presence and intelligence and surveillance missions. Should the situation arise, however, suitably capable

SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTION OF MULTINATIONAL FORCES WITHIN THE TREATY AREA.

PEACE

CRISIS PREVENTION

INTELLIGENCE  
SURVEILLANCE  
PRESENCE  
EXERCISES  
DEPLOYMENTS

CONFLICT AVOIDANCE

INTELLIGENCE  
SURVEILLANCE  
PRESENCE  
EXERCISES  
DEPLOYMENTS  
AVAILABILITY/READINESS  
THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

} INCREASED

CRISIS

CRISIS MANAGEMENT

AS FOR PEACE CRISIS PREVENTION

CONFLICT AVOIDANCE

AS FOR PEACE

DEFUSE THE CRISIS

QUICK RESPONSE  
FORWARD DEPLOYMENT  
CONTRIBUTE FORCES FOR:

BLOCKADE  
PREVENT INTERVENTION  
ASSURE RE/RE  
SAFEGUARD RESUPPLY  
THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

WAR

CRISIS MANAGEMENT

INTELLIGENCE  
SURVEILLANCE  
PRESENCE  
DEPLOYMENTS

} INCREASED

SUPPORT OF KMCs

NATO OPCON  
INTEGRATED RESPONSE  
CONTRIBUTE FORCES FOR:

SEA CONTROL  
FORWARD OPERATIONS  
FLANK DEFENCE

ASSURE RE/RE  
CONTAIN/DESTROY ENEMY  
MAINTAIN THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

WINNING THE PEACE

SURVIVAL  
LAW AND ORDER  
SEA CONTROL

CNWS194

Figure 1

NMMFs could also be readily available to contribute to Managing and Defusing any Crisis. Finally, if war cannot be prevented, multinational forces would be on hand to support the maritime KMCs, namely those of sea denial, protection of shipping and power projection.

**(U) Employment on the Periphery or Outside the Treaty Area:** On the periphery or outside the Treaty Area, the inherent ability of NMMFs to demonstrate a united commitment and resolve in supporting the political and diplomatic efforts to manage any risk or challenge to the interests of member states would be extremely valuable. Suitably configured NMMFS could contribute to the continuing requirement to be able to secure the Alliance's maritime trade routes both to guard prosperity and to ensure economic survival. The contribution of multinational forces to naval capability on the periphery or beyond the Treaty boundaries through peace, crisis and limited conflict is at Figure 2. In peace, in addition to supporting Crisis Prevention and Conflict Deterrence tasks, NMMFs would be available to provide capability in support of Area Stability tasks. These would cover a spectrum of missions falling short of conflict ranging from countering terrorism and sabotage through to paramilitary crime as well as responsibility for high profile non-military responses involving humanitarian aid. Should a situation develop which calls for military pressure to be brought to bear, NMMFs could be deployed to immediately Defuse the Crisis. However, if conflict is deemed unavoidable, multinational forces could contribute to bringing about Conflict Termination by mounting rapid and effective power projection missions.

**(U) Illustrative NMMFs Options:** NATO's commitment to the sea both within and outside the Treaty Area could be represented to an increased degree by: retaining STANAVFORCHAN, disestablishing NAVOCFORMED and introducing stronger SNFs or



**SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTION OF MULTINATIONAL FORCES ON THE PERIPHERY OR OUTSIDE TREATY AREA.**

<b><u>PEACE</u></b>	<b><u>CRISIS</u></b>	<b><u>LIMITED CONFLICT</u></b>
<b><u>CRISIS PREVENTION</u></b>	<b><u>CRISIS MANAGEMENT</u></b>	<b><u>CRISIS MANAGEMENT</u></b>
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE PRESENCE EXERCISES DEPLOYMENTS	AS FOR PEACE	AS FOR PEACE/CRISIS
<b><u>AREA STABILITY</u></b>	<b><u>AREA STABILITY</u></b>	<b><u>AREA STABILITY</u></b>
CONTRIBUTE TO COUNTERING: TERRORISM SABOTAGE INSURGENCY SMUGGLING PIRACY PARA-MILITARY CRIME NON-MILITARY RESPONSES	AS FOR PEACE	AS FOR PEACE/CRISIS
<b><u>LIMITED CONFLICT DETERRENCE</u></b>	<b><u>LIMITED CONFLICT DETERRENCE</u></b>	<b><u>CONFLICT TERMINATION</u></b>
AS FOR CRISIS PREVENTION (INCREASED) FLEXIBLE AVAILABILITY/READINESS; THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES	DEFUSE THE CRISIS RESPOND QUICKLY INTEGRATED FORCES CONTRIBUTE FORCES FOR: BLOCKADE PREVENT INTERVENTION ENABLE POWER PROJECTION SAFEGUARD ECONOMIC RESUPPLY THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES	NATO OPCON INTEGRATED RESPONSE CONTRIBUTE TO: POWER PROJECTION: LAND ATTACK AMPHIBIOUS OPS ASSURING RESUPPLY CONTAINING/DESTROYING ENEMY MAINTAIN THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES
		<b><u>WINNING THE PEACE</u></b>
		LAW AND ORDER HUMANITARIAN AID CONTROL OF SEA AREAS

CNWS195

Figure 2

OCNFs. Three illustrative options for restructuring permanent multinational forces are envisaged and are summarized as:


1. Option A. Retaining SNFL at its current strength and enlarging it as required with "on-call" (OC) forces to expand capability to Task Group (TG), Battle Group (BG) or Task Force (TF) size.

2. Option B. Introducing 2 permanent multinational groups with the capability for independent deployment and operations and being the focus of an expansion program to TFs as the situation dictates. The force could be centered on US CV/CVNs or perhaps rotationally with UK, Italian or even French or Spanish CV/CSVGs and including US and European (UK/NL, IT) amphibious assets and underway replenishment capability.

3. Option C. A composite approach relying on SNFL remaining at its present size, composition and annual commitment with the addition of 1 AO. For periods of up to 6 months each year, however, SNFL would be expanded to include: a CV element (CVE) of 1 CV/CSVG, 1 CG, 1 AOR, 1 AE), an SSN element (SSNE) of 2 SSNs, an MPA element (MPAE) of 2 MPA and an Amphibious element (AE) of 1 LHA/LPH/LPD, 3 LSL/LST, 1 AO. For the remaining period of the year, the elements would be "on-call" to NATO available to be placed under command as the situation dictates. A second SNF of similar size and composition would be based in the Mediterranean operating on a cycle 6 months out of step with SNFL.

**(U) Force Structure based on SNFL (SNFL/OCNF) (Option A):** The composition of multinational maritime forces based on continuing with the existing SNFL structure with OCNFs available to NATO as required is outlined at Figures 3 and 3A.

**OPTION A - MULTINATIONAL FORCE STRUCTURE BASED ON SNFL/ON CALL NAVAL FORCES (SNFL/OCNF)**



**Figure 3**

**KEY: OPTION A - FORCE STRUCTURE BASED ON SNFL/OCNE.**

<u>SNFL</u>	<u>On Call Task Group (OCTG)</u>	<u>On Call Battle Group (OCBG)</u>	<u>On Call Task Force (OCTF)</u>
<b>SNFL ELEMENT (SNFLE)</b>			
3 DDG/FFG 4-6 DD/FF 1 AO	3 DDG/FFG 4-6 DD/FF 1 AO	3 DDG/FFG 4-6 DD/FF 1 AO	3 DDG/FFG 4-6 DD/FF 1 AO
<b>STANDING SURVEILLANCE FORCES (SSF)</b>			
1 AWACS 4-6 MPA 2 SSN/SSK 2 FF (TA) 2 TAGOS	1 AWACS 4-6 MPA 2 SSN/SSK 2 FF (TA) 2 TAGOS	1 AWACS 4-6 MPA 2 SSN/SSK 2 FF (TA) 2 TAGOS	1 AWACS 4-6 MPA 2 SSN/SSK 2 FF (TA) 2 TAGOS
<b>CVS/LHA ELEMENT (CVS/LHAE)</b>			
	1 CVS/LHA 1 CG 1 AOR 1 AE 4-6 MPA	1 CVS/LHA 1 CG 1 AOR 1 AE 4-6 MPA	1 CVS/LHA 1 CG 1 AOR 1 AE 4-6 MPA
<b>AMPHIBIOUS ELEMENT (AE)</b>			
	5 LPD/LSL 1 CG/DDG	5 LPD/LSL 1 CG/DDG	5 LPD/LSL 1 CG/DDG
<b>SSN ELEMENT (SSNE)</b>			
	2 SSN	2 SSN	2 SSN
<b>CV ELEMENT (CVE)</b>			
		1 CV 1 CG 1 DDG/FFG	1 CV 1 CG 1 DDG/FFG
<b>URG ELEMENT (URGE)</b>			
		1 AOR 1 AOE 1 AE 1 FFG	1 AOR 1 AOE 1 AE 1 FFG
<b>CVBG ELEMENT (CVBGE)</b>			
			2 CV 4 CG 4 DDG/FFG 6 DD/FF 1 AOR 1 AE
<b>BB ELEMENT (BBE)</b>			
			1 BB 2 DD/FF
<b>AMPHIBIOUS GROUP ELEMENT (AGE)</b>			
			15 LHA/LPH/LPD/LSL 2 DDG/FFG 6 DD/FF 1 AO
<b>ASSOCIATED DIRECT SUPPORT ELEMENT (ADSE)</b>			
			2 SSN 4-6 MPA

**Figure 3a**

(U) **Advantages:** Advantages of the existing SNFL based force structure are:

1. Except for the addition of the Standing Surveillance Forces (SSF), permanent force levels are not increased. The existing composition and operating pattern of SNFL are not altered except for the addition of 1 AO. This approach may prove attractive to member states not wishing the added financial burden of increasing standing force commitments to NATO and sensitive to accusations of being considered provocative.

2. SNFL as currently composed could contribute in a limited way to peace and crisis tasks, particularly in the early stages of Crisis Management and Conflict Avoidance both within and out of the NATO area.

3. SNFL as currently composed could offer limited capability for Area Stability tasks on the periphery or out-of-area.

4. OCNFs could be held at lower readiness states for NATO and brought together as required to meet a developing situation.

5. SSF would offer NATO unique opportunities to provide rapid intelligence crucial for Crisis Management.

(U) **Disadvantages:** Disadvantages would include:

1. SNFL would need extensive and rapid expansion into TG, BG, or TF size to be able to offer NATO sufficient capability to influence situations requiring forces to Defuse a Crisis, in Limited Conflict Deterrence or Conflict Termination.

2. SNFL as presently composed would offer limited scope for combined multi-threat training and exercises.

3. The requirement for the DPC to approve the establishment of the OCNFs could

lead to delay in their formation and deployment.

4. Lack of multinational training opportunities would render the TG, BG or TF less effective during the crucial early stages of any rapidly developing situation.

**(U) Force Structure based on Increased Standing Forces (SF) (Option B): A**

multinational force structure based on increased standing forces is detailed at Figures 4 and 4A.

**(U) Advantages:** The advantages of increasing the permanent composition of SNFs are:

1. Ready and more capable forces would be immediately available to NATO which could be deployed rapidly both within and out of the Treaty Area to contribute more effectively to Crisis Management, Conflict Avoidance tasks.

2. More capable forces would be readily available to contribute to the Area Stability task out of the NATO area.


3. Forces already in place could be deployed rapidly for more effective contribution to Defusing a Crisis, in Limited Conflict Deterrence and Conflict Termination.

4. Tailored elements of the SNFs could be detached and deployed as required depending on the level of crisis.

5. The expanded composition and permanent nature of SNFs would offer increased opportunities for multinational training and exercises in a multi-threat environment.

6. The increased potential of expanded SNFs would offer member states a substitute force structure to relieve nations of the need to duplicate capabilities from solely national resources (i.e., a suitably configured SNF could assume some or all US CTF 60 tasks in the Mediterranean).

**OPTION B - MULTINATIONAL FORCE STRUCTURE BASED ON INCREASED LEVELS OF STANDING FORCES (ISF)**



**Figure 4**

**KEY: OPTION B - FORCE STRUCTURE BASED ON INCREASED STANDING**

**FORCES (SF)**

<b>STANDING FORCE NORTH (SFN)</b>		
<b><u>Standing Task Group North (STGN)</u></b>	<b><u>Standing URG North (SURGN)</u></b>	<b><u>Standing Amphibious Group North (SAGN)</u></b>
1 CV/CVN/CVSG* 1 CG/CGN 6 DD/FF* 2 SSN 4-6 MPA	2 AO 1 AOR 1 AE	1 MEU* 1 LHA/LPH/LPD 3 LSL/LST
<b>STANDING FORCE SOUTH (SFS)</b>		
<b><u>Standing Task Group South (STGS)</u></b>	<b><u>Standing URG South (SURGS)</u></b>	<b><u>Standing Amphibious Group South (SAGS)</u></b>
1 CV/CVSG* 1 CG/CGN 6 DD/FF* 2 SSN/SSK 4-6 MPA	2 AO 1 AOR 1 AE	1 MEU* 1 LHA/LPH/LPD 3 LSL/LST
<b>STANDING SURVEILLANCE FORCE (SSF)</b>		
1 AWACS 4-6 MPA 2 SSN/SSK 2 FF (TA) 2 TAGOS		

**Notes**

- \* - Aircraft Carrier for STGN could be contributed by US, UK or FR.
- \* - Aircraft Carrier for STGS could be contributed by US, FR, SP or IT.
- \* - At least 2 DD/FF should be (G) in each force.
- \* - The Amphibious Ground Force element could be provided by the US or UK/NL units in the north; and the IT or FR units in the south.

**Figure 4a**



7. SSF would offer NATO unique opportunities to provide rapid intelligence crucial for Crisis Management.

(U) **Disadvantages:** Disadvantages of expanded SNFs are:

1. Nations would need to commit increased forces to SNFs on a permanent basis (including surveillance forces).

2. The SNFs in peace would be highly visible demonstrations of NATO solidarity which may be considered provocative.

3. Nations would still need to agree on deployment options which could delay and restrict flexible mobility of SNFs.

4. SNFs would still require some further expansion to offer NATO complete capability to tackle a number of the more difficult tasks involved in Defusing a Crisis, in Limited Conflict Deterrence and Conflict Termination.

(U) **Composite Multinational Force Structure (CMFS) (Option C):**

A composite multinational force structure offering most of the advantages of Options A and B while reducing the disadvantages is illustrated at Figures 5 and 5A.

(U) **Advantages:** The advantages of a composite approach are:

1. There is a limited addition to permanent force levels with the introduction of SSF and SNFM. The existing composition and operating pattern of SNFL remains unaltered except for the addition of 1 AO and would be replicated by SNFM. This approach may prove attractive to member states not wishing the added financial burden of major increases in standing force commitments to NATO and sensitive to accusations of being considered provocative.

# OPTION C - COMPOSITE MULTINATIONAL FORCE STRUCTURE (CMFS)




Figure 5

# KEY: OPTION C - FORCE STRUCTURE BASED ON A COMPOSITE

## MULTINATIONAL APPROACH

CMFS NORTH (ATLANTIC)				
SNFL	CV Element* (CVE)	SSN Element* (SSNE)	MPA Element* (MPAE)	Amphibious Element* (AE)
3 DDG/FFG 4-6 DD/FF 1 AO	1 CV/CVN/CVSG 1 CG/CGN 1 AOR 1 AE	2 SSN	4-6 MPA	1 MEU 1 LHA/LPH 1 LPD 3 LSL/LST 1 AO
CMFS SOUTH (MEDITERRANEAN)				
SNFM*	CV Element* (CVE)	SSN Element* (SSNE)	MPA Element* (MPAE)	Amphibious Element* (AE)
3 DDG/FFG 4-6 DD/FF 1 AO	1 CV/CVN/CVSG 1 CG/CGN 1 AOR 1 AE	2 SSN	4-6 MPA	1 MEU 1 LHA/LPH 1 LPD 3 LSL/LST 1 AO
STANDING SURVEILLANCE FORCE (SSF)				
1 AWACS 4-6 MPA 2 SSN/SSK 2 FF (TA) 2 TAGOS				

### Notes.

\* - Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (SNFM) is similarly constructed to SNFL, and is under permanent NATO Command although with a staggered operating period from Jun to Jun.

\* - The CMFS North operating period is from Mar to Sep each year. However, to ensure that a minimum of 1 CMFS is available at short notice, to meet rapidly developing crises, the CMFS South operating period is staggered to run from Sep to Mar.

\* - The CVE are under permanent Command for 6 months (Mar-Sep: CMFS North, Sep-Mar: CMFS South). They remain 'On Call' until the next CVE is placed under NATO Command the following Mar/Sep.

\* - The SSNE and MPAE are under permanent NATO Command for 5 Months (Apr-Sep: CMFS North, Oct-Mar: CMFS South). They remain 'On Call' until the next SSNE and MPAE are placed under NATO Command the following Apr/Oct.

\* - The AE are under permanent NATO Command for 4 months (May-Sep: CMFS North, Nov-Mar: CMFS South). They remain 'On Call' until the next AE is placed under NATO Command the following May/Nov.

Figure 5a

2. SNFL and SNFM as envisaged could offer a limited contribution to peace and crisis tasks, particularly during the early stages of Crisis Prevention/Management and Conflict Avoidance both within, on the periphery and out of the NATO area.

3. SNFL and SNFM as envisaged could offer limited capacity for Area Stability tasks out of area.

4. Staggering the operating periods of SNFL and SNFM ensures that a minimum of one CMFS is always available for immediate deployment.

5. A staggered CMFS pattern would permit nations to commit "Element" forces first to CMFS North followed by CMFS South. This would reduce the overall annual commitment and would fit more easily into national deployment patterns.

6. A staggered CMFS pattern would permit CMFS forces while "On-Call" to be held at lower readiness states for NATO and brought together as required to meet a developing situation.

7. During the period under NATO Command, ready and more capable forces would be available to NATO which could be deployed rapidly both within, on the periphery or out of the Treaty Area to contribute more effectively to Crisis Prevention/Management and Conflict Avoidance tasks.

8. During the period under NATO Command, more capable forces would be readily available to contribute to the Area Stability task on the periphery or out of the NATO area.

9. During the period under NATO Command, forces already in place could be deployed rapidly for more effective contribution to Defusing a Crisis, Limited Conflict Deterrence and Conflict Termination.

10. Once under NATO Command, tailored elements of the CMFS could be detached and deployed as required depending on the level of crisis.

11. The expanded composition of CMFS would offer increased opportunities for multinational, multi-threat training and exercises during the periods under NATO Command. These extended training periods would be crucial if a fully worked-up multinational task group/force were to be readily available for immediate deployment.

12. The increased potential of expanded CMFS would offer member states a substitute force structure to relieve nations of the need to duplicate capabilities from solely national resources (i.e., a suitably configured CMFS could assume some or all of CTF 60 tasks in the Mediterranean)

13. SSF would offer NATO unique opportunities to provide rapid intelligence crucial for Crisis Management.

**Disadvantages:** The disadvantages of CMFS are:

1. Nations would need to commit increased forces for surveillance and to continue SNFL and maintain SNFM on a permanent basis.

2. Nations would need to commit increased forces to CMFS annually for a 4-6 month period (CVE, SSNE, MPAF, AE).

3. With the addition of SNFM and commitment of additional forces to the CMFS for 4-6 months each year, the resulting force levels in peace would still be a more prominent demonstration of NATO solidarity which may be considered provocative.

4. SNFL and SNFM would offer only limited scope for combined training and exercises for six months of each year.

5. During the "On-Call" periods, SNFL and SNFM would need to be expanded rapidly into BG size to be able to offer NATO sufficient capability to influence situations requiring forces in Limited Conflict Deterrence or Conflict Termination.

6. The requirement for the DPC to approve the establishment of the full CMFS during the "On-Call" periods could lead to delay in their formation and deployment.

7. With CMFS training opportunities limited to 4-6 months each year, the force would be less effective than an SNF if required during the "On-Call" period and at the crucial early stages of any rapidly developing situation.

8. Nations would still need to agree on deployment options which could delay and restrict flexible mobility of CMFS.

9. CMFS would still require some further expansion to offer NATO complete capability to tackle a number of the more difficult tasks in Defusing a Crisis, Limited Conflict Deterrence and Conflict Termination in high threat areas.

## PREFERRED OPTION

(U) The CMFS illustrated by Option C appears to offer significant advantages over Options A and B. The two permanent SNFs would offer NATO a rapid response force for low intensity operations in low risk threat areas while providing the focus for rapid expansion. **Contributing forces in an annual "layer cake" exercise pattern would more importantly offer the force a four to six month work-up period considered the essential minimum to produce an effective multinational battlegroup familiar with command and control operating procedures and individual unit capabilities. A ready multinational force could also relieve the requirement for the US to permanently deploy a CVBG in-area and to gap deployment in an effort to reduce OPTEMPO. Finally, the staggered operating periods of the two forces would ensure that at least one capable multinational force was readily available and at a high level of training for immediate deployment in relatively high threat areas. If necessary, units committed to one CMSF could be assigned to the second force in turn thereby reducing the overall number of units committed by each nation. However, only if a US CV or sufficient land based air cover were available would the force be capable of operating in the highest threat areas. An alternative would be to use the multinational force to "backfill" and allow an in-area US CVBG to deploy beyond the Treaty boundaries.**